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  European integration has long been associated with a particular working 
method, the “Community method”. It is characterised by a set of elements that 
differ from traditional models of international cooperation: transfers of powers 
from the member states to the European Union; the central role of a supranational 
organ, the European Commission, in the preparation of Community policies; the 
possibility of qualified majority decision-making; the adoption of binding rules, 
whose application is controlled by the Commission; and the power of the European 
Court of Justice to punish breaches of Community law. All these elements, which 
represent significant exceptions to the principle of national sovereignty, have 
brought the Community model closer to federal-type systems (Cappelletti et al, 
1986; Quermonne & Croisat, 2000). Although the existence of other working 
methods has been recognised, their importance has been minimised. The 
establishment of intergovernmental “pillars” in the areas of foreign policy, justice 
and internal affairs by the Maastricht Treaty has largely been seen as an anomaly, 
for which time should normally find a cure (De Schoutheete, 1997).  
 
  However, the expansion of the scope of European Union policies resulted in 
the questioning of this traditional interpretation of integration. An increasing 
number of criticisms were raised against what rightly or wrongly appeared to be an 
unlimited erosion of the member states’ powers. Moreover, some of the areas 
where Europe appeared to be most ambitious during the second half of the 1990s –  
economic and monetary union, foreign and security policy, or employment policy – 
were marked by the search for institutional alternatives to the classic blueprint 
(Wallace, 2000). The strategy drawn up by the Lisbon European Council is in line 
with this quest for renewal. 
 
 
1.  The Lisbon Strategy 
 
  Taking note of the transformations brought about by globalisation and the 
development opportunities arising from the new technologies, the European 
Council nonetheless identified at its March 2000 meeting a series of weaknesses 
with regard to European economic indicators: long-term structural unemployment, 
a poor employment rate, and under-development of the service sector. In the great   3
European tradition, the European Council defined what it saw as “a new strategic 
goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and most dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, 
with more and better and greater social cohesion.”  
 
The Lisbon strategy aims at encouraging the development of information 
technologies and establishing a climate favourable for innovation, by speeding up 
the removal of obstacles to the freedom of service provision and the liberalisation 
of the transport and energy markets. As part of the same impetus, it has stressed the 
necessity to modernise the European social model, inter alia by increasing 
employment, reforming the social protection systems in order to confront the 
ageing population, and by struggling against social exclusion. Even though this 
ambitious program, which endeavours to reconcile economic competitiveness with 
social concerns, has not really had the expected mobilising effect on public opinion, 
the method devised for its implementation has been the focus of much interest in 
recent times.  
 
  The conclusions of the European Council outlined what was presented as a 
new working method, the open method of coordination (OMC). “[D]esigned to 
help Member States to progressively develop their own policies, [this method] 
involves: 
•  fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
•  establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of 
different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best 
practice; 
•  translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies 
by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account 
national and regional differences; 
•  periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes.” (Lisbon European Council, 2000: paragraph 37) 
 
  This methodological attempt at systematisation contrasts with the habitual 
style of the European Council’s conclusions, which are generally keen to announce 
more tangible results. This probably stems from the desire to differentiate the new 
approach from the previous ones. Several key features of the OMC are therefore 
highlighted: 
   4
•  Its flexibility: it does not purport to define unique objectives, suitable for 
everyone, but to draw up “guidelines” that each member state is to 
translate into specific action plans, in accordance with its own particular 
situation. This desire to reflect the domestic context, in which policies are 
to be implemented, is easily explained by the nature of the policy areas in 
question and also differentiates, for example, the work at the European 
level from what can be done in the framework of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Visser & Hemerijck, 
2001) or other international organizations (Rose, 2002). There are 
numerous differences between the national social protection systems, and 
it is difficult to see how one could (and why one would want to) fit them 
into a single mould. Unsurprisingly, when addressing this issue, the 
European Council repeatedly refers to the principle of subsidiarity (Lisbon 
European Council: paragraph 38). 
 
•  The decentralised nature of the method: the impetus is no longer supposed 
to come from the top, but from collective work bringing together “the 
Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the 
social partners and civil society” (Lisbon European Council: paragraph 
37), emphasizing  the “open” nature of the new method (Rodriguez, 2002). 
 
•  The setting up of procedural routines: it is aimed at encouraging the 
pooling of knowledge, and includes defining guidelines and indicators, 
periodic monitoring of national reports, and searching for best practices. 
National officials, the key players in this process, have to be able to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of their action plans, by comparing 
their results to those of their peers. This systematic search for comparisons 
and knowledge is undoubtedly the most innovative element of the Lisbon 
strategy: governmental structures are often prisoners of tradition anchored 
in their history and, except for during periods of crisis, rarely seek to learn 
from the experience of other actors (Rose, 1993; Olsen & Peters, 1996). 
 
•  The absence of formal constraints: as the guidelines are formally devoid of 
any binding character, the peer-assessment process is aimed at fostering 
learning processes. One counts on the “emulation between the Member 
States” to ensure the new strategy’s success,
1 rather than on classical 
community control mechanisms.  
                                                           
1 “Employment, economic reforms and social cohesion.  Towards a Europe based on innovation and knowledge”, 
notes from the Portuguese Presidency of the 12
th January 2000, doc. 5256/00, point 6.   5
 
  In many respects, the open method of coordination is therefore presented as a 
third way between “pure integration” and the logic of genuine intergovernmental 
cooperation.
2 More open and less rigid than the former, the OMC is also more 
ambitious and better structured than the latter. This clear desire to define itself as an 
innovative “third way” compared to two antagonistic approaches is obviously not 
without intellectual similarities to the method and ambitions of Tony Blair’s New 




  Even though the Lisbon European Council is widely regarded as the starting 
point of the new strategy, it was more an attempt to theorise a new form of 
governance than a true innovation (Larsson, 2001). According to one of its chief 
architects, the Lisbon strategy was strongly inspired by the Luxembourg process, 
designed in 1997 to ensure the establishment of a European Employment Strategy 
(EES), and which already contained the key concepts of the OMC: guidelines, best 
practices, and objectives adapted to national specificities (Rodriguez, 2001). The 
Luxembourg process itself had more ancient roots; it attempted to transpose, in the 
framework of employment policy, ambitions and techniques that had characterised 
the leading project of the 1990s, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). As shall 
be seen below, the desire to establish a parallelism between economic and social 
policies, which was one of the hallmarks of the employment chapter of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (Goetschy, 199?), is widely shared among the promoters of the 
OMC. 
 
  Even before the Lisbon European Council, the spirit of Luxembourg had 
inspired the development of new instruments to coordinate economic policies. The 
Cardiff process, established in 1998, was meant to encourage member states to 
implement structural reforms aimed at improving the competitiveness of the 
European economy, by ensuring the liberalisation of the capital, services and goods 
markets, as well as by making the job market more flexible. The following year, the 
Cologne process was set up in order to promote “macro-economic dialogue” 
between the social partners, national governments, the Commission and the 
European Central Bank (Navarro, 2003) 
 
                                                           
2 This can be found in a note from the Portuguese Presidency dated 14 June 2000, document 9088/00. See also 
Rodriguez, 2001. 
3 Cf. for example Mark Leonard, Networking Europe (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 1999), 38-41.   6
    Raising the flexible methods of its forerunners to theory, it proposed to 
extend them to a series of new areas: the information society, research, company 
policy, social policy, and education.  Subsequently, the struggle against exclusion 
(Nice, December 2000), social protection (Stockholm, March 2001) and the 
environment (Göteborg, June 2001) were added to the list of areas in which the 
OMC should be used. 
 
Since Lisbon, the open method of coordination has become a central element 
in the debate on the renewal of integration techniques. This may explain why it is 
often looked at in a dogmatic fashion. The approach in question is at the heart of 
the current debate over reforming EU policies; it is seen as a necessary 
modernisation of the patterns of European policy-making by some, and as the 
Trojan Horse of inter-governmentalism by others.  
 
   Each of the above interpretations may claim part of the truth. Although the 
OMC seeks less uniform objectives than legislative harmonisation, which is often 
regarded as the European policy instrument par excellence, it nonetheless allows 
the Union to intervene in areas such as employment, social protection and 
budgetary policy that were considered not so long ago as the reserved turf of the 
member states. 
 
    The proliferation of the open coordination processes and their sanctioning by 
the Lisbon strategy raises numerous questions. How can we explain the vogue 
being enjoyed by these complex mechanisms? Despite the apparent similarities 
between these processes, do they all pursue the same kind of objectives? Can we 
really talk about a single method, whose objectives and parameters for success and 
failure would be identical no matter the area to which they are applied, as the 
Lisbon conclusions would suggest? Is the OMC a new government paradigm 
(Magnette & Remacle, 2000), a radical alternative to the traditional Community 
method, or simply an attempt at allowing the EU to act in  new policy areas? Is its 
efficiency likely to be the same in all the areas in which is is currently applied? 
Will it alter the balance of power between the EU and the Member States, or among 
the EU institutions?  
 
While it is still too early to draw up a final balance sheet, the aim of this 
article is to identify the key players and the dynamics a t  w o r k  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  
coordination processes, and to analyze some of the problems that have emerged in 
the first years of operation of the OMC.  In conclusion, we will also try to give 
some interim conclusions as to its potential impact in a number of key areas.   7
 
 
2.  The politics of Institutional Mimicry 
 
  How can we explain the chain that runs from the Maastricht convergence 
criteria to the Lisbon process, by way of the Stability Pact and the European 
Employment Strategy? Why a systematic reliance on similar procedures? 
 
  As it happens, it is less about discovering who is responsible for these 
innovations and more about understanding the reasons that could have encouraged 
their dissemination. Whatever the importance of the initiatives of the Portuguese 
Presidency in the months leading up to the Lisbon summit or of the Commission’s 
work on the usefulness of benchmarking (Commission, 1996, 1997), it is likely that 
these efforts would not have had the same impact if the European government had 
not had to confront a certain number of constraints.  
 
  The open coordination procedures have enabled the European Union (EU) to 
penetrate in areas where the Treaties do not envisage common policies, as they are 
largely considered the preserve of the member states. Employment and social 
protection are crucial policy sectors for all governments, as are those touching 
economic structures, be it industrial policy or public services. As far as the tax 
system and budgetary policy are concerned, they directly influence the 
governments’ margin for manoeuvre. Any political majority knows that its capacity 
to remain in power can depend on the mastering of these instruments and, 
therefore, will not easily give up control. One must ask, therefore, why a common 
discipline, as slight as it is, has been accepted under these circumstances. There are 
various reasons.   
 
Monetary union has clearly acted as a catalyst in several areas (Begg et al, 
2001). The existence of a single currency has imposed the need to coordinate 
macro-economic policies. Due to the Stability Pact,  the Eurozone countries’ 
margin for manoeuvre has been reduced; for example, they no longer enjoy the 
opportunity to fight unemployment by means of a wide-spread hiring policy in the 
public sector or to finance the social security deficit without limits. The long-term 
viability of social protection systems has become a major concern in several 
European countries. The threats resulting from intensifying fiscal competition in an 
integrated European market and from a global economy have gradually imposed 
the necessity of reforms (Vandenbroucke, 2001). The fear of a “race to the bottom” 
in the area of social protection has encouraged the introduction of mechanisms   8
aimed at ensuring a minimum of co-ordination between European countries 
(Larsson, 2001). 
 
  The reasons used  to justify the search for minimum convergence are of two 
types: the existence of challenges common to all European countries – 
unemployment, an ageing population – and the negative impact of unbridled 
competition between member states. Resorting to flexible coordination schemes, 
therefore, appeared as a compromise between a desire for common action, on the 
one hand, and the governments’ desire to maintain some degree of control over 
tools they considered essential for their political future, on the other. 
 
  The symbolic value of the Lisbon strategy should also be underlined. After 
having invested much political  capital in monetary unification, it was important for 
the left of centre governments (which were in the majority during the second half of 
the 1990s) to display their commitment to social issues.  In this context, it was 
obviously tempting to develop a method which would borrow its vocabulary and its 
instruments from the EMU (common objectives, criteria, peer control), without 
however resorting to the threat of exclusion that turned Maastricht into a rigorous 
framework (Jabko, 2003). What better way to suggest the equal importance 
attached to economic and social issues? This concern for balance, highly influential 
at the time of negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty and resulting in the adoption of the 
chapter on employment, ultimately led the designers of the OMC to come up with 
the idea of a special European Council meeting to be held in the spring. The 
meeting was to balance the growing influence of the Council of Economic and 
Financial Ministers (ECOFIN) and to ensure equilibrium between the social and 
economic activities of the European Union.
4 
 
  The choice of public policy instrument often reveals the underlying concerns. 
The vocabulary of the OMC is full of references to the market.  Management by 
objectives, self-evaluation, peer control, and preference to forms of flexible 
regulation feature prominently in the repertoire of New Public Management. 
Highly influential in Anglo-Saxon countries and international institutions such as 
the IMF and the World Bank, this school of thought endeavours to promote the use 
of techniques borrowed from corporate management among public authorities. The 
message is therefore clear: Europe is certainly going to “play a social role”, but 
without taking the harmonisation path. The OMC thus belongs to a series of new 
policy instruments attempting to do away with the legislative approach that had 
characterised the internal market program (Héritier, 2001). The objective is ‘more 
                                                           
4 Cf. infra, section 5.3.   9
Europe’, but also a different Europe. References to the market are also important in 
the objectives of the employment strategy and in the debate over pension system 
reform (Goetschy, 2002). With regard to the whole social section of the OMC, the 
search for efficiency seems to prevail over the desire for redistribution, a fact which 
has undoubtedly facilitated Europe’s a priori unexpected intervention in key areas 
of national sovereignty. 
 
 
3.  Convergence or Reform? 
 
Despite the similarities, both symbolic and substantial, that may exist 
between the various coordination processes set up within the framework of the 
OMC and the desire displayed in Lisbon to merge the different processes into a 
standard mould, there are important differences among the various policy sectors.        
 
First of all, the binding character of the processes is eminently variable. 
Although economic policy coordination and employment policy are based on EU 
Treaty provisions, in the areas of social protection, social inclusion, environment, 
research or education, coordination processes emerge from conclusions of the 
European Council. Of course, the discrepancy might be purely formal. Yet, a 
detailed study of the relevant texts shows that the degree of centralisation of the 
procedures varies considerably.    
 
With respect to economic policy coordination, the Treaty itemizes a number 
of fundamental principles (beginning with a prohibition of excessive deficits) and 
sets up multilateral surveillance mechanisms, in which certain key elements of the 
Community method can be found (Commission initiatives, although only in the 
form of recommendations; qualified majority decision-making in the Council). 
Sanctions are even envisaged in the case of budgetary discipline violations.  In 
contrast, the role of the common institutions appears to be more eclipsed in the 
field of employment policy, as the relevant Treaty provisions underline that it falls 
primarily under member states’ jurisdiction.  Although the virtues of cooperation 
are stressed, binding decisions are not contemplated (Goetschy, 1998). The same is 
true for policies against poverty and exclusion, where Community action is aimed 
at identifying best practices and innovative techniques on the basis of national 
action plans (de la Porte & Pochet, 2001; Pochet, 2003). The objectives seem to be 
even vaguer in the field of education: the Education Council has been invited to 
undertake “a general reflection on the concrete future objectives of educational 
systems…. while respecting national diversity” (European Council: paragraph 27).   10
Prudence is likewise important in the area of pensions,
5 a field in which reform 
attempts have prompted the fall of more than one government, as former French 
Prime Minister Michel Rocard once underlined. Hence, actions at the European 
level display great caution. To quote the Belgian Minister of Social Affairs and 
Pensions, Frank Vandenbroucke (2001: 61), “open coordination is a sort of cookery 
book that contains various recipes, some of which are less rich and others are more 
lavish.”  
 
The variety of methods is in part due to substantial differences among the 
policy areas concerned. The convergence process for fiscal policies established at 
Maastricht, which acted as the reference model for the OMC, rested on a strong 
convergence of views within the relevant “policy community”. The German 
monetarist model ended up imposing itself throughout Europe – and even beyond. 
There was a wide consensus regarding the need for stable prices and balanced 
budgets, and it was agreed that an independent central bank was the best way to 
achieve the first of these objectives. Very few discordant voices dared criticize 
what was defined as a sort of pensée unique (“single thought”) – an expression 
which is quite telling in regard to the balance of power between the orthodox line 
of thought and the dissidents’ views. This strong cognitive base (Radaelli, 2000; 
Padoa-Schioppa, 1994), together with the presence of a hegemonic player, the 
Bundesbank, capable of making its views prevail throughout Europe (Moravcsik, 
2000), contributed to the establishment of a fairly rigid framework. This framework 
consisted of: “constitutional” recognition – by the EC Treaty – of the objective 
(price stability); quantitative convergence criteria (the famous “Maastricht 
criteria”); and monitoring mechanisms, the credibility of which was enhanced by 
both the threat of sanctions and the very possibility of deviant countries not being 
allowed to join the ‘Eurozone club’ (Jabko, 2003). 
 
However, beyond the budgetary stability criteria defined in the Treaty and 
confirmed in the ensuing Stability Pact, this “hard” model was somewhat toned 
down and the qualitative objectives became more blurred (Navarro, 2003). 
Moreover, the multilateral monitoring procedures created the risk of a conflict of 
interests among the members of the Economic and Financial Council, the body 
responsible for direction and control. Being both judges and players, the members 
can be tempted to close their eyes to signs of deviance, lest they themselves be 
exposed to their peers’ pressure the day their own fiscal policies are investigated. 
The February 2002 discussion on the evolution of Portuguese and German public 
finances displayed evidence of the Finance ministers’ unwillingness to be too strict 
                                                           
5 Cf. Philippe Pochet’s analysis in chapter 5.   11
in their evaluation of their colleagues’ situation. The Commission’s 
recommendation to issue a formal warning to the two governments was not 
followed (Navarro, 2002). Lastly, no effective sanctions are foreseen when national 
deviations do not result in excessive deficits; for example, the reprimands sent to 
the Irish Government in the spring of 2001 went unheeded.  
 
Despite these ambiguities, it would be wrong to believe that multilateral 
control has been reduced to a mere ritual, as the monetary union has created a true 
community of fate between the members of the Eurozone. The decisions of a single 
government may have a direct impact on the well-being of all the Eurozone 
countries. They can affect the general level of inflation and force the Central Bank 
to take restrictive measures regarding interest rates. Furthermore, a blatant breach 
of collective discipline would, by nature, discredit the guidelines defined in 
common, and might even affect the stability of the single currency. This 
interdependence naturally encourages member states not to be too lax in the control 
they exert over their partners. This explains the subtle outcome of the debate on the 
German budget in 2002. On the one hand, the ECOFIN Council’s decision not to 
follow the Commission’s strict line was only reached after the Government in 
Berlin had undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at reassuring its partners and 
demonstrating its determination to avoid any risk of an excessive deficit.   
 
  In contrast, incentives for convergence are far fewer in the framework of 
employment policy. At the time the Luxembourg process was set up, the national 
governments were aware they were all facing a similar challenge (i.e. rising 
unemployment). Nevertheless, their points of view did not coincide in regard to the 
EU response to be adopted: not only did the nature and extent of the problems vary 
considerably from one country to another, but so too did the national traditions 
relating to employment issues. There was neither a dominant model nor a 
hegemonic player likely to influence the choice of its partners (Browne, 2003; 
Trubek & Mosher, 2001). Even the developers of the Luxembourg process were 
reluctant to  talk about a European employment market, as the employment 
situation is very different from one country to another, or even from one region to 
another (Larsson, 2001: 50). 
 
Moreover, the degree of interdependence between the European states is far 
more tenuous at this level than at the economic one: if one state did not manage to 
achieve the employment rate objective laid down in Lisbon, for example, this 
failure would not directly threaten the fate of its partners. Under these conditions, it 
is natural to leave the governments a certain degree of latitude regarding the choice   12
of means that would allow them to achieve the common objectives. The 
coexistence of different national models is accepted. The primary goal of 
European-wide cooperation is, therefore, to draw up common objectives and to 
identify best practices, likely to be imitated by others. In other words, the central 
aim of coordination is to encourage national reforms. Convergence is seen as a 
side-effect of the application of jointly defined reform policies, rather than as an 
end in itself (Biagi, 2000: 159). 
  
  The same statement could be made about social protection. Given the 
considerably different conceptions of the welfare state co-existing in Europe, it is 
difficult to agree on precise objectives and the best way to achieve them (Ferrera, 
Hemerijck & Rhodes, 2000). With respect to tax issues, the ambitions are even 
more limited. Far from seeking hypothetical convergences, the cooperation plan 
introduced in the area of corporate taxation simply endeavours to regulate 
competition, without questioning the principle, by eliminating practices that could 
harm other member states. Therefore, the tax “package” adopted in Nice in 
December 2000 attempts to ensure a minimum compatibility between the different 
systems (Commission, 2001: 6) by means of a disparate framework composed of a 
directive, a (non-binding) “code of conduct” and mutual control mechanism, which 
is similar in many ways to the open method of coordination (Radaelli, 2003).  
 
  In all of these areas, marked by strong national traditions and, at times, 
divergent priorities, agreements on formulas meeting the expectations of all 
participants cannot easily be found.  The unifying rhetoric adopted by the Lisbon 
European Council should not be taken literally. Apart from economic policy, where 
convergence is imperative, most coordination processes are aimed at initiating or 
facilitating reforms to be conducted at the national level. Nevertheless, this does 
not imply that they are without any added value. On the contrary, the OMC may act 
as a catalyst for integration at more than one level, particularly in sectors where 
multiple vetoes make reforms politically costly, as will now be seen. 
 
 
4.  The Dynamics of Network Coordination 
 
  Despite their diversity, open coordination processes have been inspired by 
the same logic. Emphasis is placed on developing common interpretations of 
situations, common values and techniques, through an iterative learning process. 
Discussions about common objectives and the analysis of national policies are   13
expected to lead to a mutual sharing of knowledge.
6 This supposes a long-term 
endeavour within the relevant policy communities. Therefore, a steering role has 
been entrusted to a top-level committee of experts in each of the sectors in 
question: the Economic Policy Committee, the Employment Committee, the Social 
Protection Committee, etc. These bodies are supposed to actively contribute to the 
formation of a ‘community of views’, and at times, even a ‘community of action’, 
in their respective sectors. The presence of top-level experts on these committees 
naturally reinforces mutual knowledge and trust between national policy-makers.   
 
  This form of networking is certainly not new in Europe (Dehousse, 1997). 
Most EU policies rest on preliminary efforts to “harmonise” the views of national 
policy-makers. However, in traditional Community policies, the importance of 
these forms of cognitive convergence is to some extent hidden by the adoption of 
common rules, occasionally giving the impression of a top-down policy-making 
process. Moreover, it may be convenient at times for national politicians to present 
decisions as coming from “Brussels”, even though they are compromises worked 
out by national experts, merely rubber-stamped by the European institutions. The 
role of networks of experts is more evident in the OMC, given the absence of 
binding decisions.   
 
  The notion of networking, which stresses horizontal (i.e. lacking a 
hierarchical nature) relationships among the main players, highlights one of the 
main characteristics of the OMC: the absence of a hegemonic player endowed with 
a formal authority. Some of the networks are more structured than others;  the 
European employment strategy, for example, has led to the adoption of guidelines 
defining a number of common objectives. In contrast, the OMC’s primary 
objectives appear more modest for anti-exclusion policies and even more so for 
pensions: to provide national authorities with tools they can use for the 
implementation of necessary reforms (de la Porte, 2001; Pochet, 2003). In these last 
two areas, the Community institutions have not been granted the power to make 
individual recommendations to the member states. Even the seemingly more 
“centralized” Employment Strategy has been shaped by national approaches. 
Indeed, it has been described as a mix of Third Way themes, such as flexibility and 
employability, and traditional social-democratic concerns, such as including 
women in the workforce and the role of the social partners (Trubek & Mosher, 
2001: 13-14).  
 
                                                           
6 Cf. Trubek and Mosher, 2001 and Visser and Hemerijck, 2001 for an in-depth analysis of these learning 
mechanisms.   14
What changes from one area to the other is less the process dynamics, which 
remain horizontal (bottom-bottom) rather than vertical (top-down) in nature, and 
more the degree of development of the relevant policy community at European 
level. At the time the employment policy was launched, there was no shortage of 
precise data, and national governments felt a degree of cooperation was necessary 
to face this seemingly common challenge. As a result, it was possible to agree on a 
number of priorities at a European level. The evidence suggests that similar 
conditions do not (yet?) exist in regard to action against social exclusion. The very 
concept of exclusion does not hold weight in all countries, and the data on poverty 
remain scarce and difficult to compare (Pochet, 2003). Obviously, in this context, 
defining the basis for common action remains a difficult task. 
 
  The pluralistic and decentralised nature of open cooperation procedures does 
not inevitably condemn the Commission, the pivot of “traditional” Community 
policies, to a secondary role in the OMC. True, the Commission does not enjoy the 
institutional prerogatives that have been its strength in other areas. However, the 
difference is not necessarily as great as a purely legal analysis of the situation could 
lead one to believe. On the one hand, even in ordinary legislative procedures, 
Commission initiatives are strongly conditioned by national positions. On the other 
hand, the search for cognitive convergence, which is at the heart of the OMC, 
involves tasks the Commission is better able to accomplish than any other 
institution, such as the monitoring of national action plans or the preparation of  
reports on the situation at European level, which are key elements in a process of 
knowledge accumulation. The Commission’s central place in the Community 
machinery makes it a reference point that cannot often be overlooked, particularly 
in fields with weakly structured trans-national networks.  
 
The experience of local employment initiatives has shown that the 
Commission can also play an important role disseminating innovations (Jouen, 
2000, 2001), by supplying the players with technical “tools boxes” or financial 
support through the structural funds. Furthermore, in policy areas where member 
states’ interests are in competition (such as the economic reforms central to the 
Cardiff process), the presence of a neutral umpire is essential to prevent mistrust 
between national authorities from impeding reform attempts.   
 
The possibilities for the Commission to play a meaningful role in the OMC 
are manifold. However, it must learn to play its cards differently than it does in the 
context of common policies. Its importance in open coordination processes directly 
depends on its capacity to make the values and language of a policy community its   15
own, as well as on its ability to influence the choice of the criteria for success and 
failure. By adopting this seemingly more modest posture, the Commission appears 
to have slowly increased its influence over employment issues (Trubek and 
Mosher, 2001: 11). Rather than forcefully claiming a leading role in sensitive 
policy areas, which no member state seems prepared to grant it, the Commission 
should try to establish its credibility in the eyes of experts. In other words, due to 
the fact that the Commission lacks the formal leadership role it has in the 
Community method, it must strive to acquire informal influence (Jabko, 2001), 




5.  Integration without the Law? 
 
The absence of legal constraints indisputably represents another essential 
aspect of the open method of coordination. The diversity of national traditions in 
the policy sectors in question and the desire to preserve member states’ autonomy 
explain the preference given to this “soft” approach. It breaks with Community 
tradition, as the existence binding rules coupled with strong enforcement 
mechanisms has often been a key element in EU policies. This partly explains the 
scepticism with which the OMC has been welcomed in European circles. What 
credit can one give to policies devoid of enforcement mechanisms, given that 
ensuring the implementation of binding decisions is already an arduous task? 
European Commissioner Michel Barnier echoes more fundamental fears in his 
criticism of the mushrooming of “soft law rules, prepared outside any democratic 
process and devoid of public sanction.” The law, as the base of the European social 
model, provides citizens with more efficient guarantees that any “soft” alternative, 
he stresses. “By depriving the people who have need of them of real guarantees, 
soft law only  protects the strong − and democracy does not do well out of it.”
7 
 
Indeed, the relative fragility of the control mechanisms established in the 
OMC framework is striking. Only the Treaty provisions relating to economic 
coordination and employment policy explicitly envisage the possibility of the 
Commission proposing to the Council the adoption of recommendations relating to 
individual member states. An analysis of the recommendations adopted within the 
framework of employment policy suggests that this instrument may be used by the 
Council to point out the good pupils and the laggards (de la Porte & Pochet, 2001: 
9). Yet, experience has also revealed the limits inherent in this type of control. On 
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the one hand, the member states’ representatives have the opportunity to tone down 
the Commission’s criticisms during the discussions of the committees of experts 
(e.g. the Economic Policy Committee or the Employment Committee). Before the 
Helsinki European Council, national representatives even criticised the 
Commission evaluations of national employment policies, describing them as too 
“intrusive” (Browne, 2003). On the other hand, the reaction of the Irish authorities 
to the reprimands of early 2001 made it clear that nothing can force an “offending” 
state to accept such recommendations.  Expressing their disagreement with the 
arguments presented by the Commission (and repeated by the Council), the Irish 
government calmly implemented the budget its peers had criticized (Navarro, 
2003). 
 
Should we then conclude that the complex OMC machinery is incapable of 
decisively influencing the choices of national governments? This would be going 
too far. Even in the current “soft” version, the coordination processes can in fact 
constitute a source of external constraints for the national authorities.   
 
Some of these constraints are procedural; the establishment of ad hoc bodies 
or cooperation mechanisms at the European level encourages governments to 
acquire the tools necessary to participate in joint efforts, including gathering 
statistical data, defining objectives, and creating schedules for national action. The 
participation of experts in specialized networks tends to appeal to their professional 
qualities. Their influence in a network is generally dependent on their ability to 
display a degree of knowledge and the technical skills recognized in their sphere of 
competence. Possible “breaches” in the common discipline strongly risk weakening 
their credibility (Eichener, 1992; Majone, 1997). The desire not to lower 
themselves in the eyes of their counterparts from the other member states can also 
lead policy-makers to pay more attention to the quality of their performance.  
 
Moreover, the establishment of (new) administrative procedures to prepare 
national action plans may alter the balance of power within the traditional 
administrative structures, e.g. by imposing a minimum of inter-ministerial 
coordination.  The coordination bodies can take advantage of the European 
procedures to enhance their influence, by attracting the attention of political leaders 
to their priorities and projects, as has been the case with the implementation of the 
European employment strategy (Palier, 2002). The OMC may also force 
governments to be conscious of new approaches and instruments. Thus, some 
governments became aware of the concept of social exclusion at the same time as it 
gained recognition at the European level.    17
  
  Secondly, open coordination processes can result in political constraints. 
Some actors can use the European constraints as a lever to promote their domestic 
reform agenda (Begg et al, 2001).   In this case, as in many others, the dynamics of 
the relationships between EU-member states are better understood if one goes 
beyond the traditional vision, in which states are regarded as monoliths acting in a 
unitary fashion on the European scene. Any public policy debate finds the 
supporters of the status quo coming up against the supporters of change.  For the 
latter group, best practices inspired by success stories – such as post-World War II 
German monetary policy and the Dutch polder model for employment policy – can 
constitute real gold mines of resources. They provide both a rationale for the 
questioning of certain taboos and models of instruments necessary for new actions.  
 
Change can also be legitimised by the modernising image attached to 
European integration in several countries. In Italy, for example, supporters of 
reducing the public deficits have repeatedly invoked the idea “European 
constraint”.  In France, the European Employment Strategy has questioned the so-
called “social treatment of unemployment”, i.e. the use of early retirement as an 
alternative to unemployment, because it weakens the ratio between the working 
population and the pensioners. More generally, the European Employment Strategy 
has brought forth new arguments in support of an “activation policy”, encouraging 
people to return to work. Naturally, this “windfall effect” will be all the more 
important for countries far from the dominant European model. By definition, the 
added value of European coordination mechanisms will be more limited for those 
countries already close to the established objectives.
8  
 
Thirdly, the central role in the OMC of the notion of management by 
objectives may confine member states to a specific logic, from which it could be 
difficult to escape. Quantitative indicators can be good yardsticks enabling a large 
audience to monitor the evolution of a policy. For the want of sufficient progress, a 
government may be forced to dedicate supplementary resources – be it funds or 
human resources – to the policy in question, in order to preserve its credibility.  For 
example, by accepting the objective of a female employment rate of 60 per cent by 
2010, southern European countries, which are well below this level, are required to 
notably increase the resources they devote to this aspect of employment policy. 
Under such circumstances, one can therefore understand the initial reluctance of 
some governments to define quantitative indicators with regard to employment 
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(Trubek & Mosher, 2001: 16) or anti-exclusion policies, and their close scrutiny of 
the work the experts in charge of defining the indicators in question (Pochet, 2003).  
 
A fourth constraint for national governments can be found in the time 
management aspect of the OMC. The time horizon set for most objectives – ten 
years – is clearly longer than the average term of the governments and political 
majorities.   Following the precedent set at Maastricht with inclusion of the 
objective of price stability in the Treaty, national governments have committed 
themselves to the long term, shackling their own hands and removing a certain 
number of choices from the electoral sparring matches. No matter the election 
result, the winner will see its margin for manoeuvre reduced, due to the choices 
made in the framework of the coordination procedures.  True, most of these 
decisions are not legally binding.  Yet, very few governments will be able to risk 
challenging the best practices defined in common at the European level without 
damaging their credibility.
 9 Moreover, it will be difficult for them to persuade 
public opinion as to the reasons why they do not consider themselves bound by the 
objectives established in sensitive areas such as employment or the fight against 
exclusion.   
 
The time horizon aspect is all the more important as reforms often take years 
to produce results. Furthermore, their results are often uncertain, particularly for 
complex and tangled issues, such as social protection or public finances. A 
government facing an uncertain or limited time frame will not be tempted to 
embark on major projects (Visser & Hemerick , 2001: 14; Olsen & Peters, 1996). 
Thus, action at the European level, even if it is only slightly restricting on a formal 
plane, can play a determining role in national policy-making, by encouraging 
successive governments to maintain the course of the reforms.  
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6.  Potential and Limits of the OMC 
 
It would be premature to aspire to a final judgement on the open method of 
coordination. The main stakes are at the national level, and it is too soon to carry 
out a systematic analysis of the method’s impact over recent years. Nevertheless, 
some coordination processes – the coordination of economic or employment 
policies– have been around long enough for us to have an idea of their strengths 
and weaknesses. Furthermore, several types of problems have already appeared in 
the new policy areas included in Lisbon. Analysis of the problems shows, first, that 
the instruments of the OMC are not always adapted to the defined objective, and 
secondly, the coordination between the different parts of the process can be 
laborious. Lastly, work must be done to increase the legitimacy of decision-making 
within this framework.   
 
6.1. The Limits of Convergence 
 
The OMC is no more a panacea than any other policy instrument. Its 
contribution may be valuable in policy areas where reforms can be facilitated by 
sharing knowledge, examining techniques successfully used in other countries, 
encouraging a better structuring of national actions, etc. Yet there are limits to such 
lesson-drawing exercizes. Success stories are often the product of a combination of 
factors. If the best practices are detached from their context and applied 
mechanically, they risk not producing the expected results (Radaelli, 2002a, Rose 
2002). 
 
More importantly, will the OMC’s soft mechanisms be sufficient in areas 
where convergence between national policies is regarded as imperative? The 
answer is undoubtedly no, as one can see from the experience in the area of 
economic policy. Even though monetary union makes it necessary for Eurozone 
countries to closely coordinate their policies, these member states have not been 
able to outline a common policy going beyond the rules of budgetary orthodoxy 
contained in the Stability Pact. The sale of Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) licences and the reactions to the leap in oil prices in autumn 2000 
took place without any real attempt to harmonise the member states’ points of view 
(Navarro, 2001, 2003). Likewise, the German and Irish episodes mentioned above 
demonstrate the limits of peer control on non-standard practices. The temptation 
not to embarrass a colleague is often strong. Furthermore, the Irish episode has 
shown as long as a country respects the deficit criteria outlined in the Stability Pact,   20
it can ignore the reprimands of the Council, as the latter is devoid of the power of 
sanction in such cases.  
 
Obviously, these structural weaknesses do not encourage confidence in the 
single currency. There is a gap between the existence of a common interest 
(recognised by the Treaty) and the structures established to ensure its defence. In a 
more general fashion, one could argue that in those areas where convergence is 
indispensable, the decentralised procedures of the OMC, which are fundamentally 
based on the good will of the participants, are too weak to guarantee efficient 
policy coordination. The same is true when the member states are in a situation of 
competition or when the political orientations of their governments are too 
different, as is shown the slow progress in taxation policy or in the structural 
reforms conducted in framework of the Cardiff process .     
 
6.2. Coordinating Coordination 
 
As has been seen, the OMC hinges on strong sector logic. It implies the 
development of a community of views among experts and policy-makers. 
Knowledge-pooling is supposed to facilitate a gradual learning process, leading in 
the long run to forms of cognitive convergence, and possibly to policy transfers.  
This logic raises several types of coordination problems.  
 
First, even within a relatively homogenous policy community, it would be 
wrong to expect gradual convergence to simply spring out of the experts’ 
discussions. Once broad policy directions have been defined at the highest level, 
the tasks of stimulating joint work and regularly analysing the lessons learned must 
be delegated, in order to ensure the gradual development of a common body of 
knowledge, particularly in those policy sectors with strongly contrasting national 
traditions. In fields such as economic policy or employment, this role has been 
expressly entrusted to the Commission. However, the latter does not enjoy the same 
authority in the OMC as it does in “ordinary” Community policies. It will only be 
able to wield influence in a specific policy sector by adopting the concerns and 
language of experts (Muller & Surel, 1998: 51-53).
10 Moreover, it has sometimes 
had to incur the member states’ wrath, as they do not always accept being told what 
to do. The risk is that these forms of resistance will lead to the Commission to 
censure itself, which can only harm the quality of the collective work.   
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Secondly, the method defined in Lisbon endeavours to ensure an overall 
coherence between the numerous coordination processes established over recent 
years, by attributing “a leading role in the area of orientation and coordination” to 
the European Council. The heads of state and government are to meet each year in 
the spring to examine the progress made and define the new general guidelines for 
social and economic integration (Lisbon European Council: paragraphs 7 and 36). 
Although this seems consistent with the European Council’s role as defined in the 
Treaties, this search for coherence is a source of difficulties at several levels.  
 
In a nutshell, there is a tension between the logic of peer cooperation, on 
which the OMC is based, and the desire stated in Lisbon to entrust the European 
Council with a centralized steering role. As previously has been exemplified, the 
dynamics of OMC are essentially based on voluntary cooperation, with the specific 
concerns of each policy community and the professional pride of the participants 
playing driving roles. In this framework, any attempt at outside control strongly 
risks being perceived as an illegitimate interference. In order to overcome this 
contradiction, actors in charge of ensuring coordination may be tempted to take a 
neutral approach, by endorsing the orientations that have emerged in each policy 
area. This appears to have been the Commission’s choice, as its synthesis reports to 
the Stockholm and Barcelona European Council meetings read like long catalogues 
of would-be “priorities” (Commission, 2001, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the idea of entrusting the European Council with a general 
coordination role is not feasible. Attributing an (executive) monitoring role to the 
heads of state and government is undeniably in line with recent trends, marked by 
increasing the power of the European Council within the EU political system. 
However, the heads of the national executives are by necessity “generalists” and 
are not automatically the best at guiding processes often dominated by technical 
concerns. As such, the temptation to ratify the conclusions of the specialised 
Councils of Ministers is naturally very strong. This was clear in Stockholm, as the 
European Council granted as much time to the crisis in Macedonia as to the 
progress of the Lisbon process (Agence Europe). It would probably be more 
judicious to give the European Council a task more in line with the interests and 
authority of its members – to define the policy objectives and settle conflicts not 
resolvable at a lower level – rather than overloading it with technical files that risk 
only receiving a cursory glance.  
 
6.3.  The Balance Between Economic and Social Objectives  
   22
One of the aims of the Lisbon process was to ensure a balance between the 
economic and social aspects of EU activities. It was considered useful that the 
different formations of the Council be associated with the preparation of broad 
economic policy guidelines, which up until that time had been formulated by the 
ECOFIN Council (Lisbon European Council: paragraph 35). The balance between 
economic and social policies was also the main raison d’être of what could be 
considered the “coordination of coordinations”. With each coordination process 
evolving according to its own dynamics, it was necessary to oversee the evolution 
of all the policies in question. The spring European Council meeting was to play a 
central role in this; it was to ensure harmonious progress towards the Lisbon 
objectives. However, it has until now demonstrated a poor capacity for 
coordination and has proved to be a source of difficulties in several respects. 
 
First, the logic of specialization that is so pervasive in the OMC is far from 
guaranteeing a regular progression in all areas. On the contrary, the situation varies 
considerably from one field to another. In certain sectors, the traditions of 
cooperation are well established and clear convergence can be seen, both at the 
level of the analysis and that of the objectives; in other areas, the search continues 
for a common lexicon and reliable statistical tools.   
 
This type of situation may lead to imbalances between the policy sectors. As 
a rule, issue cutting across several policy areas will be dominated by the most 
homogenous community of experts. Being prime movers, they will find it easier to 
set the agenda and influence the policy decisions that will follow. In the case of 
pensions, for instance, the Economic Policy Committee mobilised itself more 
rapidly than the Social Protection Committee, thus allowing it to emphasize the 
budgetary aspects of pension system reform, with little consideration for social 
objectives (Pochet, 2003). A similar situation existed within the Commission: the 
Directorate Generals (DGs) in charge of finance and competition called for pension 
reform before the DG for employment and social affairs was able to mobilise itself 
(Begg et al, 2001: 36).  
 
In general, the players active in budgetary and economic matters appear to 
benefit from a clear competitive advantage in comparison to their colleagues in the 
social sector. Not only do they enjoy the right to intervene in all policy areas – no 
policy is deprived of budgetary or economic dimensions – but they are also able to 
rely on a consolidated register, of which some key elements, such as budgetary 
stability, are explicitly recognised in the Treaties. By default, they can therefore 
offer a solution to any coordination problem; in the absence of a clear alternative, it   23
is natural to turn towards them. During the Stockholm European Council, for 
example, the General Affairs Council showed little interest with regard to the 
questions tackled within the framework of the Lisbon process, and contrary to the 
Treaty provisions, it was the Economic and Finance ministers who assisted the 
heads of state and government.
11 This was an irony of fate; the spring summit, 
which was originally designed to increase the status of  social questions, had 
instead ended up strengthening the influence of the ECOFIN Council.    
 
6.4. The Legitimacy of Open Coordination Processes 
 
The establishment of the OMC was essentially motivated by considerations 
of efficiency; it facilitated the launch of reform strategies in a series of areas by 
developing networks of cooperation among national policy-makers. The legitimacy 
of decisions reached within this framework may therefore be problematic. 
Generally speaking, networks tend to resist any type of external control – be it 
hierarchical or democratic – insofar as this, by nature, upsets collective work. As a 
network of networks, the OMC tends to heighten this trend: management by 
objectives and procedural routines tend to remove decisions from electoral cycles 
(Ferrera, Hemerijck & Rhodes, 2000: 84).  
 
This depoliticization of decision-making may have merit, in so much as it 
allows for reforms otherwise difficult in national systems paralyzed by the multiple 
vetoes of stakeholders. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the public, cooperation among 
experts within more or less obscure networks is not necessarily the best form of 
legitimacy.  That is, of course, unless one believes it is the quality of the results 
achieved that will ensure the legitimacy of a given policy. Opportunities for debate 
are necessary, as are control mechanisms, particularly because the OMC tackles a 
large number of redistributive issues, traditionally legitimised by universal suffrage 
in democratic societies. Pension reforms, social protection, the struggle against 
exclusion and sustainable development are policy areas in which difficult choices 
are necessary. Experts’ recommendations are not sufficient to establish legitimacy, 
as they involve values and interests necessarily falling within the political debate 
(Olsen & Peters, 1996: 33-34). 
 
Questions about the role of the European Parliament are commonplace in 
reflections on the future of open coordination (see for example, Vandenbroucke, 
2001: 62). The Commission has tackled this issue within the framework of a White 
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Paper on European governance. The report deplored the weak position of the 
European Parliament, which is only marginally linked to the coordination of 
economic and employment policy, and encouraged it to adopt a pro-active strategy, 
adapted to the schedule and functioning of the OMC, in order to influence the work 
of the various committees and the spring European Council meetings (Commission, 
2001: 26-27).  
 
However, one still wonders if the level of analysis is the correct one. Much 
of the work taking place at the EU level is focused on what could be called the 
‘cognitive level’ (construction of analysis schemes and definition of common 
objectives). The taking of “hard” decision-making is deliberately excluded by the 
decentralized architecture and “soft” nature of the OMC. National authorities claim 
a leading role in the OMC; it is at their level that decisions on concrete reform 
plans and on the allocation of financial resources are taken; they decide whether or 
not to follow the recommendations adopted at the European level. This is not to say  
that all decisions taken at the national level are in essence legitimate (Hodson & 
Maher, 2001), but rather that efforts to democratize the OMC should primarily 
focus, above on the national level. The limited Europeanization introduced by open 
coordination processes should not be used by national governments as justification 
for excluding public debate from important decision-making in the name of a vague 
European orthodoxy. Some of these processes already foresee the need to include 
the social partners in the preparation of national action plans. However, there is still 
much to be done to ensure public debate on the positioning of national authorities 
within the European coordination processes. 
   
 
 
7. Conclusion: Making Sense of the Open Method of Coordination 
 
The open method coordination was presented at the Lisbon European 
Council as a new instrument in the range of European policies. The innovations are 
manifold, in terms of both the objectives and the methods. Several elements suggest 
that one should proceed with caution when assessing the impact of these changes; 
hence the  strong methodological component in these interim conclusions. 
 
First of all, it is important to recognize the novelty factor is only relative. The 
preservation of national specificities has figured highly in European priorities since 
Maastricht, and it did not take until 2000 for policy makers to come to the 
conclusion that cognitive convergence is a prerequisite for most types of European   25
action. Cooperation mechanisms had already been established in several policy 
sectors prior to the Lisbon European Council meeting. The Lisbon strategy mainly 
endeavoured to systemise the use of flexible forms of coordination and develop a 
single strategic objective for the future adjustment to new technologies. 
 
Secondly, despite the fairly uniform framework laid down is Lisbon, the 
various areas covered within the OMC are relatively heterogeneous. The relevant 
policy communities are not all equally integrated at the European level, and the 
degree of convergence sought varies from one area to another. One must keep these 
differences in mind when assessing the impact of coordination processes on 
national policies. 
 
Likewise, analysis of the OMC must take into account its special features. 
Neither its efficiency nor its legitimacy should be measured according to traditional 
EU policy parameters. The fact that the OMC upsets the traditional distribution of 
tasks among the European institutions and is based on a lighter legal framework 
than harmonisation decisions is not a problem in itself. What is important is to 
establish whether this will enable it to achieve positive results, or whether it will 
become a liability.  
 
From this point of view, the potential of the new approach appears to be 
greater in those policy areas, in which Europe is expected to act as a catalyst for 
reform, but the ultimate responsibility for the political choices remains a national 
prerogative. Alternatively, in sectors where convergence is imperative, the “soft” 
character of the open coordination procedures is a clear weakness.   
 
Fourthly, it remains to be seen whether the systematic aspect of the OMC 
will prove to be efficient. In fact, there seems to be tension between the 
“horizontal” logic that forms the basis of network cooperation and the willingness, 
shown in Lisbon, to ensure a balance between economic and social objectives. 
Policy coordination is one of the most obvious weaknesses of the European 
institutional structure, as its fragmentation makes the emergence of political 
projects involving several policy areas difficult. In theory, the Commission appears 
to be the best institution to foster the development of an overall political agenda. 
Thanks to its relative stability and involvement in all areas covered by the OMC, it 
could be the laboratory where such a synthesis is prepared. However, in order to do 
so,  two conditions would need to be met: its internal coordination capacity must be 
reinforced and its credibility in the national capitals must be restored. 
   26
To conclude, the open method of coordination is not the radical alternative to 
the Community method some people hoped it would be and others seemed to fear. 
There are important analogies in the way both operate. Despite this, the objectives 
the two methods pursue are different: the OMC allows for the establishment of 
flexible forms of common action in policy areas where centralized decision-making 
is not possible, or even desirable. At the same time, it is doubtful that it could 
efficiently replace the more centralized Community method in sectors where 
uniformity is required . The background notes of the Portuguese Presidency in the 
run-up to Lisbon highlighted that the OMC had to be combined with other available 
methods, depending on the nature of the problems to be solved (Council of the 
European Union, 2000: 6). In some areas, this could even lead, in the long run, to 
the adoption of binding decisions. In other words, as with many policy reforms, the 
elements of continuity remain strong, despite the reformers’ preference for 
emphasizing the elements of change. Bibliography 
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